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ABSTRACT 
 
Due to recent changes in global shipping, we investigate the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 – also known as the Jones 
Act. When constructed, our governing body decided that the Act was necessary for the country’s naval defenses and 
for proper growth of foreign and domestic commerce. The plan was for the fleet to be owned and operated privately 
by citizens of the United States. However, in today’s economic conditions some are wondering if the Jones Act is a 
liability to foreign commerce. In our work, we explore the advantages of naval defense and shipbuilding as well as 
the disadvantages on commerce and U.S. transportation infrastructure. To conclude, we offer opinions for policy 
changes to create a more level playing field for the U.S. to compete in global logistics. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
he Merchant Marine Act of 1920, commonly referred to as the Jones Act, is a U.S Federal statute that 
regulates maritime commerce in U.S. waters and between U.S. ports (Brackins, 2009).  Two parts of 
the Jones Act are of specific importance. The first part heavily supports American built, owned, and 
staffed ships. This was accomplished by restricting shipping and passenger trade within the U.S. to American-owned 
or American-flagged ships, and specified that at least 75% of a ship's crew must comprise American citizens. Thus, 
foreign vessels cannot travel port-to-port in the U.S. 
 
In the second part of the Jones Act, the use of foreign parts and labor in ship construction and repair was also greatly 
restricted. This section of the Jones Act was created to produce a strong, well staffed merchant marine that could be 
responsible for efficiently serving the U.S. (Smith, 2010). 
 
The intent and purpose of the Jones Act has been specifically outlined in its preamble: 
 
“It is necessary for the national defense and for the proper growth of its foreign and domestic commerce that 
the United States shall have a merchant marine of the best equipped and most suitable types of vessels 
sufficient to carry the greater portion of its commerce and serve as a naval or military auxiliary in time of 
war or national emergency, ultimately to be owned and operated privately by citizens of the United States; 
and it is declared to be the policy of the United States to do whatever may be necessary to develop and 
encourage the maintenance of such a merchant marine” (1800JonesAct, 2008). 
 
Overall, effects of the Jones Act have been felt widely in the shipping industry. In comparison to other nations that 
lack such cabotage restrictions, there has been a noticeable decline in the U.S. shipping fleet. Thus, the U.S. is losing 
out to the competition of other nations (Brackins, 2009). 
 
  
T 
International Business & Economics Research Journal –First Quarter 2018 Volume 17, Number 1 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 2 The Clute Institute 
GLOBAL SHIPPING LANES 
 
Before we look into the advantages and disadvantages of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920, we should first describe 
global shipping lanes and how they have changed over time. It has long been known that Europe and the Far East have 
been trading goods for hundreds of years. However, as the shipping industry grew with the discovery of new ports of 
call, so did shipbuilding. With such increases, more and larger ships have made it to the waterways of the world. 
Europe is still the destination of many, but new routes with new markets have appeared.  
 
For instance, some ships still leave the Far East, travel around Indonesia and pass through the Suez Canal to reach the 
Mediterranean Sea and the ports of Europe. Others simply cross the Pacific Ocean, use the United States as a land 
bridge (crossing by truck or rail), and travel by ship again across the Atlantic Ocean to reach Europe. Still others leave 
the Far East, travel through the Panama Canal and reach Europe in non-stop fashion. Figure 1 below illustrates today’s 
major shipping lanes. 
 
 
Figure 1. Major Shipping Lanes of Today (Rodrigue, Comtois & Slack, 2009) 
 
 
 
 
Approximately six generations of container ships have been built through the years. They have grown from carrying 
500-800 containers, to approximately 11,000 to 14,500 containers (Rodrique, Comtois, & Slack, 2009). Production of 
the next generation of container ships is underway, and these are expected to carry 20,000+ containers. 
 
The major concern now is that fewer, yet larger foreign ships are on the waterways and are only allowed a single stop 
at a U.S. port. Less stops by larger container ships equates to less efficient port operations and more sporadic 
transportation infrastructure usage. Global shipping has changed, but the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 has not kept 
up with the dynamics of the industry. 
 
ADVANTAGE – NAVAL DEFENSE 
 
First and foremost, it is important to realize that at the time in which the Jones Act was enacted, a strong, resilient 
merchant fleet was crucial for our country’s success. The United States was recognizing its great need for a dependable 
defense fleet, and World War I proved their concerns true. The infant United States Navy did not possess the capability 
of performing all military functions, and thus relied on the civilian sector for the transport of military cargo to overseas 
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destinations (Brackins, 2009). Hence, the United States Merchant Marine was a significant part of the country’s naval 
defenses, providing transportation and logistics on the waterways of the world. 
 
Practically no one would argue that foreign vessels should be a part of a country’s naval defenses. Only allies at a time 
of need provide that service. Yet, as the years have moved on, the United States Navy has become one of the most 
complete and powerful navies in the world. Unfortunately, its supporting civilian merchant fleet has been slowly 
disappearing. 
 
ADVANTAGE – SHIPBUILDING (PROTECTIONISM) 
 
The Jones Act is really a trade and commerce law that was part of a larger Merchant Marine Act. It requires all trade 
delivered between United States ports to be transported in United States flagged vessels, constructed in the United 
States, and owned by American citizens. It is protectionism in the shipbuilding industry at its finest, but was intended 
as a necessary contribution to the Act at its outset. It keeps U.S. shipbuilders working and U.S. crews employed. 
 
However, protectionism comes at a cost. Generally, manning and flagging a vessel have very little impact on total 
cost. Vessel costs are essentially made up of capital and operating costs. Capital costs refer to the actual vessel 
construction costs. Operating costs include earnings paid to the crew, fuel charges, insurance, maintenance and repair, 
and other administrative expenses. Of these, labor and maintenance costs are typically higher for United States vessels 
than for foreign-flagged vessels. United States crew costs generally account for most of the differences in operating 
costs between U.S. and foreign flagged vessels. For example, manning costs account for 77 percent of the operating 
cost differential for a typical oil tanker and 81 percent of the cost differential for a typical containership (Brackins, 
2009). This is what puts U.S. sea transportation at a significant disadvantage to other foreign vessel manufacturers 
(Jones Act Hinders, 2010). 
 
The Acts’ effects have been felt widely in the shipping industry. In comparison to other nations that lack such cabotage 
restrictions, there has been a noticeable decline in the U.S. shipping fleet, losing out to the competition of other nations 
who have exploited such protectionism. 
 
DISADVANTAGE – COMMERCE 
 
While the U.S. invented the container shipping line industry in 1956, it is sadly absent from global shipping. The 
country that provides the biggest market for imported goods should be a leader in global shipping. Yet, the two largest 
U.S. owned companies, Matson and Horizon, are ranked 30 and 36 respectively, among container lines (Grapper, 
2011). As long as the U.S. still insists that all domestic cargo be carried by U.S. made ships crewed by American 
citizens, they will continue to be surpassed. As a result of the Jones Act still being in effect, the U.S. container fleet 
essentially only supplies Guam, Alaska, and Hawaii (Grapper, 2011). Of the world’s 41,674 cargo-carrying vessels in 
2016, only 169 were U.S. registered (US DOT, 2016). It is ironic that container shipping, conceived by the U.S. and 
responsible for standardizing the transport of break-bulk cargo, has abandoned the U.S. due to its extreme trade 
protectionism. 
 
The extreme trade protectionism imposed by the Jones Act extends well beyond U.S. borders. It has created challenges 
for worldwide shipping firms. Examining world leader, Maersk’s container shipping routes coupled with the fact that 
the Jones Act only permits foreign ships to dock at one U.S. port on their journey, it is evident that the U.S. plays a 
role in their unwillingness to use the Panama Canal. Without the ability to dock at multiple ports on the U.S. coasts, 
shipping companies such as Maersk lack the economic incentive to incur the expense of traveling through the Canal. 
 
Additionally, the restrictive nature of the Jones Act has created an economic disadvantage for use of the Panama Canal 
by many major shipping companies. Maersk has decided that it will exclusively use the Suez Canal to get to Europe. 
After that, in 2013 Maersk stopped using the Panama Canal to transport goods from Asia to the East Coast of the 
United States (Park, 2013). Instead, the Suez Canal permits their use of bigger ships which translates to increased 
profits. No doubt, larger ships with tens of thousands of containers produce less traffic on the waterways, but can 
require more stops along the way. So, to make up for lost revenue the Panama Canal raised its rates. The cost for 
passing through the Panama Canal tripled between 2009 and 2013 (Park, 2013). 
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DISADVANTAGE – U. S. TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE CONGESTION 
 
The history of transportation in the U.S. has progressed from rivers, to rail, to highway systems. However, some think 
if the Jones Act were repealed the U.S. may be headed back to using our 25,000 miles of navigable waterways, or 
maritime highways for energy and environmental reasons. Those major waterways are located along the: U.S. West, 
Northeast and Gulf coasts, Great Lakes, and Mississippi River. 
 
The major maritime highways of the past could certainly absorb already stressed rail and highway capacity. After 
noting that a single barge tow can carry as many as 456 twenty-foot-equivalent (TEU) containers, and that currently 
only 1.4 billion tons (about 2% of U.S. domestic cargo) spends time on any navigable U.S. waterway, Davis (2010) 
cited the following statistics regarding the underutilization of our maritime highways:  
 
• One gallon of fuel would move one ton of cargo 60 miles by truck, 200 miles by locomotive, 
or 500 miles by barge – Port of Oakland. 
• Congestions on our nation’s highways caused urban Americans to travel 4.2 billion hours more 
and to purchase an extra 2.9 billion gallons of fuel for a congestion cost of $78 billion – Texas 
Transportation Institute. 
• One barge can replace the use of two stack trains or 350 container trucks. This relates to an 
annual reduction of about 238,000 tons of carbon dioxide, 2,640 tons of nitrogen oxide, 110 
tons of reactive organic gases, and 15 tons of diesel particulate matter – Eco Transport. 
• The cost to add one lane-mile of highway under normal conditions ranges from $2.3 million for 
a small urbanized artery to $13.4 million on a major interstate. Obviously, building more 
roadways when waterways are readily available is imprudent – Federal Highway 
Administration. 
• There are roughly 155 fatalities per million ton-miles by highway transport. If transported on 
the maritime highway, the number of fatalities could be reduced to one – Eco Transport. 
 
For example, ports that could benefit by reduced congestion would be the West Coast ports. The Ports of Los Angeles 
and Long Beach are the first and second (respectively) busiest container ports in the U.S and are the choice of many 
foreign shippers when given only one berthing option by the Jones Act. The Port of Los Angeles is located just north 
of the Port of Long Beach on the California coastline. Together, the two ports are known as the San Pedro Bay Ports. 
These two ports handle more than 40% of the nation’s total containerized cargo import traffic and 24% of the nation’s 
total exports (Port of Long Beach, 2007). Combined, the San Pedro ports moved 1.16 million TEUs in January 2012, 
up from 1.14 million a year earlier (White, 2012). For the year 2015 the two ports had a combined volume of 15.3 
million TEUs, and the growth does not stop there. The two ports are expected to increase volume at an average rate 
of 3.9% per year, and exceed 41.1 million TEUs by 2040 (Port of Long Beach, 2016). Then again, that forecast could 
actually be low. Depending on economic assumptions, the 2040 volume could fluctuate between 30.9 and 54.5 million 
TEUs (Port of Long Beach, 2016). 
 
In turn, this increased traffic has led to a rise in congestion at the two bustling ports. Deep draft ports for large container 
ships experience delays as space for increasing volumes of import and export cargo is limited by factors such as 
environmental and community concerns. Congestion also occurs when vessels arrive at the same time rather than 
dispersed throughout the week (U.S. Department of Transportation, 2009). The time lost as a result of this bottleneck 
can be 3 to 6 days depending on the season (Conway Consulting, 2008). Even when ports can berth and unload ships 
quickly, the increasing size of container ships is moving congestion from ports to access roads, rail and highways 
(U.S. Department of Transportation, 2009). Such delays and congestion at the Long Beach and Los Angeles ports 
have shippers and receivers looking for more reliable, efficient options for transportation. 
 
SUMMARY CONCERNS AND RECENT ACTIONS TAKEN 
 
The Jones Act undeniably impacts the maritime community, and an examination of the issues at hand provides fuel 
for those both for and against its repeal. Table 1 below summarizes these pros and cons, particularly focusing on issues 
such as cost, control, and security.  
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The Act has managed to earn media attention regarding several issues over the past years, and precedents have been 
set under necessity. In times of emergency, Presidents such as George W. Bush and Barack Obama have been faced 
with the decision of whether or not it is pertinent to waive the Jones Act to allow for outside help. 
 
 
Table 1. Pros and Cons of Jones Act (Lee, 2011; Michaeli, 2014) 
PROS CONS 
Provides not only increases in union jobs but manufacturing 
jobs where equipment is built 
Cost of building vessels domestically hinders transportation 
by water between U.S. ports 
Blocks foreign control of ships Increases trucks on highways leading to more traffic and pollution 
Has provided 40,334 vessels Gives competitive advantage to existing foreign ship operators 
Has provided 499,676 related jobs Higher crew costs 
Responsible for $100.3 billion in economic output Difficulty in finding investors who must be U.S. citizens 
Generated $11.4 billion in federal, state and local taxes U.S. shipbuilding industry cannot provide enough reliable ships at an affordable price to comply with Jones Act 
Supports national security since U.S. ships are not 
government subsidized 
Caused U.S. Merchant Marines to drop from 2000 ships to 
170 or less since World War II 
Companies building tugs and barges for petroleum products 
may go to China without Jones Act. 
U.S. is not able to take full advantage of efficient marine 
highway system and widening of Panama Canal 
 
 
For example, in 2005 after hurricane Katrina devastated the Gulf Coast, President Bush temporarily waived the Jones 
Act a mere three days after the hurricane made landfall. Only one month later, he waived the act again to allow for 
help after hurricane Rita. These actions allowed for the port-to-port transportation of petroleum and refined petroleum 
products. Again in 2012, The Department of Homeland Security decided to issue a waiver of the Jones Act to remedy 
the severe fuel shortages following super storm Sandy. Like before, the waiver allowed refineries along the Gulf Coast 
to transport fuel using foreign vessels (Robert, 2014). The waivers did not increase the total amount of fuel within the 
U.S., but it provided flexibility for that fuel to move as rapidly and efficiently as possible to where it was most needed 
(Hennessey, 2010). During other major storms and natural disasters, the Jones Act has been blamed for shortages of 
products and materials needed in a timely manner.  
 
POLITICAL ACTION 
 
On January 22, 2015, Senator John McCain introduced an amendment on the Senate floor to repeal portions of 
the Merchant Marine Act of 1920. His argument for the repeal of this antiquated law is that is hinders free trade while 
making United States industry less competitive. This, in turn, raises prices for the American consumer (McCain, 
2015).  His proposal, to eliminate the requirement that the United States build their own ships, supports the arguments 
of many oil refiners, manufacturers, and state governments. Their opposition to the Jones Act is based on the premise 
of protecting American jobs. 
 
Senator McCain, who is serving as chairman of the Senate’s Armed Services Committee, argues that a repeal of the 
Jones Act could save consumers approximately $1 billion annually (Robert, 2014). Current legislation for the repeal 
is facing tough opposition based on the fact that the act protects U.S. industries from foreign competition. McCain’s 
supporters argue that the opposite effect may be true. Based on a comparison of U.S. shipbuilding exports compared 
to exports of U.S. semis and trailers, shipbuilding comprises on about 2.4% of that market (Riley, 2015). There are 
other flaws in the logic of the Jones Act. Why does the U.S. require a ban on foreign-built vessels for commercial 
purposes to fulfill defense needs when there is no ban on foreign-built aircraft, cars, and trucks? In addition, the U.S. 
Department of Defense has leased foreign vessels to fulfill missions requiring additional sealift capacity (Riley, 2015). 
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Senator McCain is unyielding in his efforts to eventually gain the needed support of the repeal. His stance is that the 
detrimental effects on U.S. infrastructure, transshipment of goods between domestic ports, road traffic, pollution, and 
U.S. investment prove that the repeal of the Jones Act ultimately benefits American consumers (Riley, 2015). 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In a 1993 study, the International Trade Commission (ITC) indicated that the Jones Act costs the United States a total 
of $3.1 billion per year (Boyd, 2009).  If that study were repeated today, the results would likely be astounding. Using 
the evidence compiled above with regard to the impact of the Jones Act on the U.S., certain conclusions can be drawn 
about the implications of the Act today.  These conclusions show, for the most part, that the Jones Act has a negative 
effect on the United States economy as a whole. Many will argue that it would certainly prove beneficial to remove 
such restriction on trade and allow for free market competition.  While the benefits cannot be completely quantified, 
reason would indicate such benefits undoubtedly exist.  
 
Some feel that eliminating only the “built in the United States” requirement, not the entire Jones Act, would align 
coastwise cabotage laws with similar laws which protect United States’ airline and trucking industries. Both the 
trucking and the airline industries are somewhat protected from foreign competition but are not required to purchase 
equipment built exclusively in the United States (Jones Act Hinders, 2010). 
 
On the other hand, proponents of the Jones Act argue that the regulations are necessary in order to maintain job 
protection and prevent the loss of jobs to foreign competitors, who charge less than fair wages for jobs that are similar 
to those performed by United States’ workers. In regard to national defense, they also claim that transporting war 
material exclusively in United States’ flagged ships is crucial to the country’s overall protection and success.  
 
Professionals in the industry agree that the U.S. is in need of a far-reaching National Transportation Plan (Bowman, 
2007). Whether this sentiment is true or not, it is no secret that the Jones Act has been the source of many concerns of 
people in the United States today. Is it simply a regulation meant to strengthen our military and protect our seamen 
and shipbuilders, or does the Jones Act contain provisions that simply do not align with today’s economy anymore? 
 
Finally, most economists will agree that barriers to free trade reduce a country’s standard of living. In their eyes, it 
might be time to remove the protectionism barriers of the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 and let the markets take over. 
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